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Reflecting on the use and abuse of scientific data facilitates students’ ethical 
and epistemological development 
Susan Howitt, Australian National University, and Anna Wilson, University of Stirling 
Abstract 
Scientists use judgment in deciding what and how much data to present in publications but 
science degrees rarely address this issue. Instead, scientific knowledge is presented as certain and 
students have limited opportunities to use their own judgment in the laboratory. A consequence 
of this may be that students approach science with a moral absolutist mindset, believing that 
science is about learning facts and scientists have little need to exercise ethical judgments in 
relation to data. Students may also hold different ethical standards for themselves and 
professional scientists. We draw on data from a first-year science module to show that these 
views can be challenged by encouraging students to reflect on their own behaviour and that of 
famous scientists in situations with varying degrees of professional ethical ambiguity. We 
provide evidence of significant transitions in students’ thinking, suggesting that reflection on 
these issues may lead to substantial epistemological and ethical development. By the end of the 
module, many students had moved from an initial position of certainty to the acceptance of 
multiple viewpoints or to a more mature understanding of the evidence-based nature of science, 
as well as gaining the ability to critique decisions and make ethical judgments.  
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Introduction  
The exercise of judgment in the presentation and manipulation of data is an important part of the 
work of a scientist, and one that has a strong ethical dimension. Although scientists constantly 
make decisions about the rights and wrongs of putting forward particular conclusions and 
evidence to support them, this is not usually openly addressed in undergraduate science 
curricula. Instead, many students graduate from a science degree with the impression that science 
is about truth, that good science leads to unambiguous results, and that only bad science leaves 
room for doubt and interpretation.  This is a problem not only for those who will go on to be 
practising scientists, but for anyone who wishes to engage with the big scientifically-informed 
issues facing contemporary society, such as debates around climate change and evolutionary 
issues, where questions of trust and bias loom large.  Here, we analyse the impact of confronting 
students with cases where famous scientists have dealt with ambiguous data to explore students’ 
conceptions of ethics in data interpretation. 
Manipulation of data, and the point at which it becomes fraudulent, is a fertile issue with which 
to challenge students because it surfaces the need to make judgments in an area of interest to 
them.  The generation of publishable data by scientists is a negotiated process that relies on 
expertise to include or exclude particular results (Latour & Woolgar, 1986; Roth, 2012). Minor 
levels of manipulation can also be justified as ‘tidying up’; this appears to be common practice in 
the competitive world of science where publication can depend on the perceived clarity and 
quality of the data (Steneck, 2011). Two key areas of the undergraduate science curriculum 
where students might engage with such ideas are in their own laboratory work and in subjects 
which explicitly address the nature and process of science, for example through historical case 
studies.  However, while science degrees have a strong emphasis on practice in the form of 
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laboratory and field work, the way these activities are structured often provides limited 
opportunities for students to use their own judgment and engage in the types of decision-making 
required of autonomous scientists (Chinn & Malhotra, 2002; Edmondson & Novak, 1993; 
Handelsman et al., 2004). The judgments made in the generation of data could be illustrated by 
historical studies of actual scientific practice, especially where controversy has occurred, but 
such approaches are often peripheral to, or absent from, the content-heavy curriculum. Thus, 
despite the importance of these issues to an understanding of science (Roth, 2012), students are 
rarely, if ever, exposed to them.  
The need to make judgments about data is one aspect of a more general concern with science 
education; that it fails to address the central role of evaluation and critique (Duschl, 2008; Ford, 
2008; Ford, 2015). Scientific knowledge is always scrutinised by the scientist who does the work 
and then by peers through peer review and subsequent replication and extension. This provides a 
sociocultural dimension to science as scientific claims are both validated by the community and 
tested against their value in explaining natural phenomena.  Ford (2008) has argued that the 
focus of many curricula on the acquisition of content knowledge and skills omits the role of both 
levels of accountability but that it is an essential component of scientific practice and reasoning 
that students need to understand. He proposes that students should be taught a “grasp of 
practice”, which encompasses both construction and critique of knowledge claims. This would 
enable students to learn new content in ways that engage them in thinking like a scientist does. 
Gaining a grasp of practice means that students “know that scientific knowledge is held 
accountable through its explicit connections to nature’s behavior, know how to play the roles of 
constructor and critiquer appropriately, and know that the interaction of these on the communal 
level produces reliable scientific knowledge” (Ford, 2008, p416 italics in original). 
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Importantly, gaining a grasp of practice includes recognition of the need for judgment. The 
nature of any professional “practice” is that it cannot be fully defined by a set of rules, even 
though it may appear to contain regularities (Ford, 2015; Gherardi, 2009). As noted above, 
scientists make judgments about what data to present (Latour & Woolgar, 1986; Roth, 2012) and 
they know that their decisions will be scrutinised by the scientific community. However, what is 
under-emphasised in the work of Ford, Roth and others is the ethical dimension of those 
judgments.  There are no rules on which to base these decisions; instead scientists use their 
expertise but may also be influenced by their desire to convince peers, potentially leading to 
ethical dilemmas.  
The institution of science operates through a series of norms that define the behaviour of 
scientists but within these, there is considerable ambivalence (Merton, 1973; Mitroff, 1974). 
Science is said to be self-correcting, as errors or fraud are detected through peer review and/or 
replication (Merton, 1973) but there have been concerns raised about the effectiveness of these 
processes (Broad & Wade, 1982).  Firstly, in some disciplines repetition and replication of 
results are unlikely because of the cost of experiments or the need to collect large data sets and 
secondly, the use of publication metrics to assess performance has increased pressures on 
scientists to publish, resulting in a focus on novelty and impact rather than confirmation and 
replication (Ioannidis, 2012; Munafò et al., 2017; Smaldino & McElreath, 2016). However, 
while scientists may be seeking recognition through publication, research suggests they are also 
motivated by a desire to do, and be recognised for, excellent science (Merton, 1973; Mitroff, 
1974). Thus, it appears that scientists’ judgments about what data to present to others are not just 
determined by expectations of scientific scrutiny in peer review and by the wider audience, but 
also by their own views of acceptable conduct. While very few scientists are guilty of outright 
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misconduct, many engage in what have been termed “questionable research practices” (Fanelli, 
2009). Ethical considerations come into play here because scientists’ motives for such practices 
can range from a gut feeling based on expertise to a desire to support a particular view. When 
deciding not to publish a data point or result, scientists may be doing so because they believe it is 
the “right” course of action, one that will benefit the progression of their field and the 
construction of new knowledge (Mitroff, 1974; Waller, 2002). This decision, however, may arise 
because of unconscious bias or beliefs (Munafò et al., 2017), resulting in what others might see 
as the unethical manipulation of data.  
As well as helping to position scientists as less than perfectly rational humans, the use and abuse 
of data is an issue that interests students because they can see how it applies to their own 
behaviour in practical classes. Students’ experiences often include technical problems in the 
laboratory, where they are faced with decisions such as whether to repeat a failed experiment, 
use data from another student, make up the expected result, or be rigorously honest and perhaps 
receive a low mark for having failed to complete the experiment. Previous work has found that 
students respond to this situation with different expectations for themselves and ‘real’ scientists; 
whereas many think it is acceptable for them to share or fabricate data to meet assessment 
requirements, they have an idealized view of professional science that excludes technical 
difficulties and holds scientists to the highest ethical standards (Del Carlo & Bodner, 2004; 
Vhurumuku, Holtman, Mikalsen, & Kolsto, 2006). Similar results emerged in a study which 
examined how chemists’ epistemological beliefs varied with their expertise, spanning high 
school students to professional chemists (Samarapungavan, Westby, & Bodner, 2006). While a 
number of issues were addressed, most relevant here is that participants were specifically asked 
about how they handled empirical anomalies. Students, including postgraduates, tended to see 
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anomalies as wholly negative, resulting from personal failure or technical problems. It was only 
the professional chemists who identified a potentially productive role for anomalies as they 
recognised that new research directions could arise from an unexpected finding. Similarly, Chinn 
and Brewer (1993) noted seven responses to anomalous data, ranging from outright rejection to 
modification of a theory but professional judgment and an understanding of context were 
required to choose an appropriate response. 
These studies raise two issues. First, students do not always recognise a need for judgment in 
relation to data, with outright rejection appearing to be a default position for unexpected results, 
and second, where the need for such judgments is recognised, different ethical standards are 
applied to themselves and scientists, and the ethical dimension inherent in these judgments may 
not be explicitly recognized at all. This, in turn, raises questions about how students perceive 
science and what they are actually learning about how science is practised. The existence of two 
separate views of science has been conceptualised by Hogan (2000), who defined the proximal 
view as the way science students understand the science they do and the distal view as reflecting 
student understanding of professional science (Hogan, 2000). The separation of proximal and 
distal views of science has implications for students’ development as scientifically literate 
citizens and for the way in which they approach learning science (Edmondson & Novak, 1993; 
Hogan, 2000). Proximal views may result in a ‘right answer orientation’ (Hodson, 1999) because 
science is seen as a body of fixed knowledge and science learning is seen as memorising facts. 
As long as such a view of science is productive in meeting assessment requirements, students 
may have little incentive to change (Edmondson & Novak, 1993; Elby & Hammer, 2001). 
Indeed, students’ understandings of the nature of science are notoriously difficult to change 
(Clough, 1997; Lederman, 2007; Matthews, 2012; Sandoval, 2014) and there is therefore a need 
7 
 
to investigate the reasons for this more thoroughly. Distal knowledge relates to the way students 
perceive ‘real’ scientists, who may be seen as discoverers of new knowledge and theories and are 
often idealised (Hogan, 2000; Howitt & Wilson, 2014), particularly as professional science may 
be presented by teachers and textbooks in idealistic and unrealistic ways (Allchin, 2003). 
Scientists are therefore not seen as wrestling with the kinds of difficulties students experience as 
part of learning and doing science. While students see studying science as a separate enterprise 
from being a scientist, they are unlikely to see the need for professional expertise and judgment.   
Theoretical framework 
Our aim in this study was to examine how students develop the ability to make ethical judgments 
in the use of scientific data. This will depend on both students’ perceptions of science and their 
ability to accept the uncertainty inherent in a need for judgment. Acceptance of uncertainty 
implies an epistemological stance and the role of epistemic cognition in science learning is an 
active and growing area of research (reviewed in Bendixen & Rule, 2004; Elby, Macrander, & 
Hammer, 2016; Kelly, McDonald, & Wickman, 2012; Sandoval, Greene, & Bråten, 2016; 
Sinatra & Chinn, 2012). These reviews make clear that epistemological studies of science 
learning have developed from different academic traditions, including science education, science 
studies, psychology and philosophy which have distinct but overlapping theoretical frameworks. 
Here, we focus our discussion on two dimensions that are important for the current study; the 
proximal/distal axis, which defines the scientific context in which judgments are made and the 
personal/developmental axis, which places the student in relation to their ability to accept the 
contestability of knowledge. 
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It might be expected that a university science education would bring proximal and distal views of 
science together, as students engage with the professional practice of scientists. However, this 
depends on the degree to which students actually do interact with professional scientists and the 
way that teaching and learning experiences are designed. Teaching and learning activities may be 
underpinned by epistemologies very different from those of authentic science (Chinn & 
Malhotra, 2002). As a consequence, students may adopt epistemological positions that are 
productive for meeting assessment requirements (Edmondson & Novak, 1993; Elby & Hammer, 
2001), but are not necessarily those desired by educators. Epistemological considerations are not 
always made explicit in curriculum design and thus there is a need to examine the relationship 
between science learning and epistemological development (Kelly et al., 2012). Recognising that 
students may have different proximal and distal views of science, and that these are shaped by 
their experiences of learning science, is fundamental to better assisting students develop their 
own understanding of what science is and how it is done.   
Proximal and distal understandings of science are one way to express the complexities of 
students’ epistemological approaches. We have chosen to use this categorisation because it 
exemplifies the distinction important to this study; the difference between students’ views of 
themselves as science students and their views of professional scientists when it comes to 
decisions that might be viewed as forms of data manipulation. However, it is one expression of a 
more general idea, that students deploy different epistemological resources in different contexts. 
A review of studies addressing the nature of science distinguishes between enacted views, based 
on what the students do, and professed views, which include their declarative knowledge about 
science (Deng, Chen, Tsai, & Chai, 2011). A distinction has also been made between inquiry 
learning or scientific practices, which focus on what students do and students’ conceptions of the 
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nature of science, which reflect their understanding of professional science (Lederman, 2007).  
Sandoval (2005) adopted an epistemological approach using the terms practical epistemology to 
describe the way in which students construct and understand their own scientific knowledge 
through inquiry and formal epistemology to describe students’ expressed beliefs about 
professional science. He argues that although students’ practical approach to inquiry may mimic 
that of scientists, this does not necessarily influence their formal epistemologies and therefore we 
need to better understand students’ practical epistemologies so that we can support their 
integration into formal epistemologies. Although these studies employ different perspectives and 
use different terms, taken together they provide compelling evidence that students hold more 
than one understanding of science and that their different understandings are deployed in 
different contexts.   
The second dimension underpinning students’ attitudes to science and science learning is their 
personal epistemological and ethical development because the ways in which students 
conceptualise knowledge, and their understandings of how ethics enters into different levels of 
scientific practice, will impact on their learning behaviours in science. In order to make the 
transition to ‘being a scientist’, students need to move from a position where they are receivers 
of secure, accepted knowledge to a position where judgments can be made because they see 
themselves as being able to contribute to knowledge construction. They also need to develop a 
sense of how personal, social and cultural factors can introduce an ethical dimension not just to 
decisions about what science to practice, but also how to practice it.  The role of epistemological 
development in learning was first identified by Perry (1970) but has been explored by a number 
of other authors since (reviewed in Hofer & Pintrich, 1997), with all having in common that such 
development involves substantial qualitative changes in the nature of learning and how 
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knowledge is viewed. In these models, epistemological and ethical development occurs through 
several key transitions (Figure 1) in which knowledge is initially viewed dualistically, as either 
right or wrong. The first transition involves the recognition of uncertainty and the existence of 
multiple opinions but does not yet include the ability to distinguish between them. The next 
transition recognises the role of evidence and context in justifying one viewpoint over another. In 
the final transition, which has been recognised as more social and ethical than epistemological 
(Moore, 2002), the student commits to particular values as a basis for making life decisions.  
Insert Figure 1 about here 
Moore (2002) describes the Perry scheme as 'reflect[ing] two central interwoven dynamics: 1) 
confronting and coping with diversity and uncertainty with respect to new learning, and 2) the 
attendant evolution of meaning-making about learning and self' (p22). Both of these are highly 
relevant to our study. Moore also notes that, '[i]n its representations of both intellectual and 
epistemological perspectives (and their relationships), the model continues to focus our attention 
on the intimate connections between the individual learner, subject matter, and process of 
understanding, and remains a rich heuristic framework' (p18).  It is this richness and focus on 
relationships that makes the Perry scheme appropriate for our analysis. Much subsequent work 
has taken a more restricted view of epistemic cognition that excludes identity and emotion from 
examination of beliefs about knowledge (reviewed by Elby et al., 2016). However, it has recently 
been argued that a broader definition of epistemic cognition that does include affect, motivation 
and learning context may be more useful because the narrow focus misses important aspects of 
student behaviour (Chinn, Buckland, & Samarapungavan, 2011). We concur with the latter view, 
reflecting our interest in how students respond to particular ideas in particular contexts and the 
interplay between ethics and epistemology.  
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Research aims and questions 
 We have used the lens of proximal and distal views of science knowledge to investigate 
students’ understandings of the need for judgment in producing, analyzing and presenting 
scientific data and the consequent ethical implications. The specific issue of data and the more 
general issue of critique of claims has been identified as an omission from many science 
curricula (Duschl, 2008; Ford, 2008; Roth, 2012) but one that is important to science education. 
It is, therefore, important to assess students’ attitudes to these issues so that pedagogical 
strategies are developed from an evidence base. The teaching approach examined here was to 
problematize data interpretation through case studies of scientists facing difficult decisions on 
the generation, analysis and presentation of scientific data, including where the difficulties might 
be seen to arise because the scientists held a conceptual conviction that, in the face of conflicting 
data, resulted in a moral dilemma. There are particular issues around decisions to remove 
outlying data points that students find challenging because there is a fine line between acceptable 
data manipulation and that which is fraudulent. Pre-reading for the case studies covered cases of 
famous scientists whose decisions to include data, or not, were open to the interpretation that 
they may have behaved fraudulently. The cases included examples where data was challenging 
to collect and the experiments prone to technical difficulties and where scientists had prior 
commitments to particular theories. The need for the scientists to make decisions about which 
data should be included in the final analysis was therefore highlighted, introducing students to 
the more general issue of how scientific data is generated and validated (Roth, 2012). This 
context prompted students to consider and justify ethical judgments in science – both their own 
and those of professional scientists. Their responses to the case studies have been analysed to 
answer the following questions: 
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1) To what extent do undergraduate science students recognise the need for ethical 
judgements in data analysis and how does this change after a case study on this issue?  
2) What factors influence students’ ethical judgments in proximal and distal domains?   
We have taken a sociocultural approach to the analysis of student views, drawing on a body of 
research suggesting that students should be given opportunities to understand the process of 
science and to develop their own thinking about science (Clough, 2006; Duschl, 2008; Matthews, 
2012; Rudolph, 2014), rather than adopting a prescriptive approach that privileges particular 
views. Such approaches lend themselves to a situated analysis of students’ ethical and 
epistemological development (Sandoval, 2014; Sandoval, 2005; Sinatra & Chinn, 2012) in which 
both proximal and distal views of science may emerge. It is important to include reflections of 
students in studies of this kind because reflections may include justifications for behaviours that 
may not be evident from direct observation of practice (Sandoval, 2014) and because the act of 
reflecting may prompt deeper engagement and epistemological development (Bendixen & Rule, 
2004; Sinatra & Chinn, 2012). Thus, our approach has been to provide students with stimulus 
material on the ethical implications of data interpretation and then to analyse their reflective 
responses. 
Methods 
Context and participants 
Participants were enrolled in a first year cross-disciplinary course on the nature of science, which 
has been described previously (Howitt & Wilson, 2014). The course is taught as a series of case 
studies on different issues of science and encourages students to develop and discuss their own 
opinions. It has been taught at a research-intensive university for three years with 30-45 students 
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each year, 60% of whom were female. The majority of enrolled students were in their first year 
of university study and were undertaking a Bachelor of Science or one of its higher-entry score 
variants that focus on research experiences. Most students were enrolled in three other, 
conventional science courses, with a minority undertaking arts or law courses in addition to 
science. Students enrolling in the course represented a reasonable cross section of the science 
disciplines including psychology and earth sciences as well as maths, physics, chemistry and 
biology.   
At the start of the course, students were asked if they were willing to allow their written 
submissions to be used as data in a research project examining how students learn about 
scientific research processes. Permission was given via forms approved under the Human Ethics 
Review process at the institution. The written reflections on the relevant case study and the final 
integrative reflection of the 101 students who gave permission (92% of all students in the course) 
have been used in the analysis. 
As mentioned above, the case study on data manipulation included readings on a series of 
historical instances of possible data manipulation or fraud. One reading described how the Nobel 
prize-winning physicist Robert Millikan initially published all his data, including what the 
scientific community at the time deemed as evidence of inadequate scientific skill (Waller, 2002, 
Chapter 2). His scientific notebooks show that Millikan excluded results that were not consistent 
with his findings in later publications – sometimes with a rationale based on the experimental 
conditions, but sometimes with no stated reason.  This case study gave the opportunity for 
students to discuss and reflect on the role of gut feeling, and the ethics of suppressing data in 
response to earlier criticisms of inadequate professional competence.  
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Another reading described how another Nobel prize-winning physicist, Arthur Eddington, 
reported only those results that supported Einstein’s theory of general relativity when he set out 
on an observation of a solar eclipse through which he intended to prove this theory (Waller, 
2002, Chapter 3). This case study gave students the opportunity to discuss and reflect on the 
complex role of conviction and belief in science and scientific progress. It raised the question of 
whether someone who was one of the only people in the world at the time to understand 
Einstein’s work (and so might be capable of judging its scientific and logical merits) might be 
tempted to construct the strongest possible argument for its acceptance.   
The final reading concerned the famous twin studies undertaken by psychologist Cyril Burt, in 
which he is suspected to have invented not just data but both participants and co-researchers 
(Wade, 1976). In this case, the inadequacy of Burt’s ethics with respect to data might be clearer 
than in the cases of Millikan and Eddington, but the opportunities to discuss wider and more 
long-term social consequences were richer. Classroom activities also introduced examples of 
demonstrably fraudulent scientists.   
Students were encouraged to consider the level of ambiguity in the data in the different cases, 
and to postulate reasons why a scientist might consciously or unconsciously misrepresent their 
results, both in terms of conceptual convictions and sociocultural factors such as religious 
beliefs, or the seeking of personal gain/status.  
Data collection and analysis 
Formative and summative assessment activities during the course provided rich qualitative data 
that allowed us to explore variation in the ways in which students responded to questionable 
manipulation and presentation of scientific data.  After each case study, students were provided 
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with a prompt question for their reflection that left open whether they discussed their own 
behaviour or that of professional scientists. Students also completed a final reflection at the end 
of the course in which they were asked to consider how the course had changed their views of 
science. In each reflection, students were asked to write about their views and to justify their 
opinions. By encouraging such epistemic reflection (Sinatra & Chinn, 2012), we hoped to gain 
information on the beliefs they used to make sense of science and their epistemological goals and 
discourse (Sandoval, 2014).  We thus not only had a snapshot of the range of views and 
responses of students enrolled in the course; we also had evidence of if and how their views 
changed over the semester, and their own post facto reflections on those changes. 
All reflections were de-identified and entered into NVivo to facilitate analysis of data and 
identification of material relevant to particular themes. Qualitative analysis of the reflections 
used a constant comparative approach (Strauss & Corbin, 2008) to identify emergent themes 
relating to students’ perspectives on their learning and their understandings of the nature and 
practice of science. Our analysis was informed by the techniques of phenomenography (Marton 
& Booth, 1997), which focuses on range and variation in understandings or conceptions (rather 
than looking for the most commonly-held conceptions) and is particularly effective in identifying 
hierarchies of expanding sophistication or nuance.  
The analysis proceeded in several stages. Initial open coding was based on searches of the 
reflections in NVivo against key words, for example, fraud, data manipulation, practical class, to 
identify relevant subsections of each text. Using the paragraphs extracted in this way, the first 
author developed codes based on common themes raised in the reflections, and within those, 
identified whether proximal or distal science was addressed. Initial codes and sub-categories 
were descriptive and wide-ranging, for example, scientists as human beings (eg, motivation, bias, 
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empathy, peer pressure) and experimental data (eg, objective, manipulation, fraud, publication, 
need for interpretation, scientific method).  During this process, it became evident that students 
exhibited a range of qualitatively different views relating to both proximal and distal conceptions 
of science. These appeared to represent different degrees of sophistication in their awareness of 
nuance around the need for scientists to make and validate judgments on data. Many students 
also commented on the ways in which they became aware of more possibilities, demonstrating 
transitions to positions of greater sophistication. This led to a phase of more conceptual coding, 
with the focus on variation in the recognition of nuance. (Here, consistent with 
phenomenographic approaches, sophisticated or nuanced does not refer to a more or less 
“correct” response.  Rather, a less sophisticated understanding is one that recognizes only a small 
number of factors and/or possibilities, while a more sophisticated understanding is one that 
recognizes more factors and possibilities.)  
The second phase of the analysis thus structured the data along two conceptual dimensions: 
proximal/distal, and awareness of nuance.  These codes were then tested by both authors reading 
complete reflections to ensure that the codes were consistent with students’ arguments, refining, 
elaborating and changing the coding as necessary. As these structures were further refined, it 
became evident that they could be mapped onto the epistemological positions identified by Perry 
(1970) resulting in an adjustment of categories that formalized this similarity. This was 
consistent with our aim of understanding students’ responses to the ethical implications of data 
analysis and provided a theoretical framework with which to examine change. The codes from 
this stage of the analysis and how they mapped to Perry’s positions are shown in Table 1. Thus, 
Perry’s positions became our primary categorisation, with proximal and distal responses seen 
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within these, and we began to focus more on transitions between these categories, and to look for 
what appeared to trigger them.   
Insert Table 1 about here 
The final phase of analysis involved several reliability checks to confirm coding and 
classifications. Throughout all three phases, clarification of the coding structure followed an 
iterative process as both authors read and discussed the reflections and the codes, leading to 
agreement on the final categories. We also actively searched for reflections that showed 
transitions between the modes and critically examined these to ensure we had not missed 
important phases. In the final iteration, representative quotes were considered in context of the 
entire reflection to ensure that participants’ views were accurately represented and that the 
quotes were illustrative of the mode.  Reliability was also enhanced by triangulating data 
obtained from reflections with questions posted to the course discussion forum, the initial survey 
completed by students and notes from class discussions. The questions, in particular, highlighted 
the difficulties that students had with making judgments and in accepting the fallibility of 
scientists, confirming the focus of our analysis on transitions and ethical development. 
Evidence for changing epistemological and ethical understandings of scientific judgment 
The questions posted to the course discussion forum, class discussions and written reflections 
showed students were thinking seriously about the representation and manipulation of data and 
the difference between data and published results, often apparently for the first time. Some 
students recognized that scientists are sometimes in situations where they must make 
professional judgments about what constitutes publishable data. Some recognized a range of 
factors that might lead to scientists subconsciously excluding some data as invalid, such as bias, 
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culture, religion and so on. Students also discussed pressures and personal drives that might lead 
to the conscious manipulation of data.  
We observed that a consideration of the ethical aspects of data selection and presentation 
prompted many students to recognise the contestability of scientific claims and the need for 
judgment. Within the written reflections, a range of levels of sophistication regarding these 
positions was evident. As discussed above, these levels mapped closely to the various levels of 
intellectual and ethical development described by Perry (1970) and one of the most striking 
aspects of the data was the ways in which transitions between these levels were evident. In the 
following, we show that many students started the course at the least sophisticated, dualist level 
of Perry’s scheme (Figure 1). We then provide evidence for transitions to more sophisticated 
levels, as students recognise uncertainty and eventually become able to make judgments based 
on evidence (Figure 1 and Table 1). We suggest that lower levels of sophistication tend to be 
coupled with students’ self-perceptions as very different to practising scientists, and that 
increasingly sophisticated positions with regards to data manipulation are coupled with an 
increasingly strong identification between students and scientists. 
Initial views of science are largely unexamined 
Our first research question was, to what extent do undergraduate science students recognise the 
need for ethical judgements in data analysis and how does this change in response to the case 
study?  In their final reflections, students discussed changes in their views during the semester, 
with many identifying their initial views as unsatisfactory for various reasons. A strong theme 
that emerged from these reflections was that most students had not previously considered what it 
means to be a scientist and to do science. The role of science student had been accepted without 
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question and for many this included a largely extrinsic motivation to gain marks, even when 
students were also interested in science for its own sake. This resulted in the view that it was 
acceptable for students to alter results during laboratory work, as Jonathan explains. 
We knew the answers we were meant to be getting, obviously there was something wrong with the equipment we 
were using or our technique – it wasn’t exactly state of the art. I’d never really thought of this as unethical, I knew 
we weren’t meant to do it, but then again it wasn’t like we were performing ground breaking research, it seemed to 
me that the most important thing was to get what I knew, without question, were the right answers. (Jonathan)  
Comments such as this one indicate that students are completely focused on proximal science 
and do not see laboratory work as professional practice or consider the implications for their 
development as scientists. Similar attitudes were observed in previous studies of chemistry 
students’ attitudes towards laboratory work (Del Carlo & Bodner, 2004; Vhurumuku et al., 
2006). A consequence of this attitude is that students do not see the need for professional 
judgment. Since they perceive that a right answer exists, the task of a scientist is to uncover this 
answer. This reflects an inappropriate extrapolation of a proximal view based on the student’s 
experience of learning science to the nature of professional science. The two quotes below 
illustrate the proximal and distal expressions of this view.  
I really liked studying science because I believed it was objective and there was always a ‘right’ answer. (Sophie) 
The definition of scientific method which I have held for most of my thinking life was as a process of discovery, 
analogous to the careful cleaning of a painting to reveal the masterpiece underneath. I considered scientific method 
to be a mode for the revelation of ‘the true nature of things’. (Hannah) 
On the surface, this latter description of science might seem quite appealing, and might be shared 
by some scientists, as it allows for initial findings to be over-turned or replaced by subsequent 
investigations. However, it represents an epistemological stance in which scientific knowledge is 
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pre-existing truth, and fails to capture the sense that knowledge is created, not merely 
discovered, through scientific work. 
The scientific method was widely seen as a set of rules that scientists follow, again leading to a 
passive view of what scientists do.  
I had a very idealised view of how both scientist and science actually worked. I believed that science followed the 
very well known and linear path known as the Scientific Method. (Daniel) 
I also believed this [diagram of the steps of the scientific method] to be the one true scientific method which all 
scientists adhered to. (Mark) 
Mark continued the discussion of his initial views with this comment on the class response: 
I was not alone in missing ethics out when asked to think of the qualities of a good scientist. (Mark) 
It is evident from these and similar quotes that many students had not previously considered that 
science might involve professional judgment; data from a pre-course survey, which had asked 
students questions aimed at probing their preconceptions about the nature of science, suggested 
that this was the case for the majority. Most students had unquestioningly adopted a somewhat 
idealized view of science, in which scientists were seen as ‘seekers of truth’, uncovering nature’s 
secrets through the application of a defined and unwavering procedure of scientific method. 
Thus, both proximal and distal views excluded any need for judgment because the objectivity 
and rules of scientific method were seen as allowing no scope for intervention.   
Final views of ethical judgments in science evolve for many students 
Throughout the course, many students became more aware of the ethical dimension of data 
analysis but a wide range of views was observed. Most students themselves noted significant 
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changes in their views of data manipulation and presentation during the course. Almost all 
reflections included discussion of distal views of science as students wrote about their responses 
to the case studies. Not all reflected on their own practice but many also discussed proximal 
views of science, with some attempting to integrate the two.  This led to a much more diverse 
range of views than had been held initially (at least as deduced from students’ retrospective 
reflections and supported by the pre-course survey). A set of hierarchical categories that covered 
the range of perceptions evident in the participants was developed. Four categories, based on the 
four core positions defined by Perry (1970) were identified (Figure 1). A feature of these 
positions is that they are qualitatively different, and movement between them requires significant 
conceptual changes, which were sometimes evident in the students’ reflections. All categories 
covered both proximal and distal views, although not all individual students wrote about both.  
Table 1 summarizes how each mode was expressed in relation to proximal and distal conceptions 
of science and scientific practice.  The following sections explore these expressions in more 
detail.  
Mode 1: dualism 
Students who appeared to be in this category at the end of the course held the belief that science 
is completely objective and there is no need to use judgment in the use and presentation of data. 
Most had not changed their views throughout the course. Such students labelled all selective data 
use as fraud and in the most extreme position, failed to recognize that the behaviour of scientists 
can be influenced by their expectations and backgrounds. The quotes below are typical in their 
expression of absolute values and their characterization of science as being about ‘facts’ or 
‘truth’. 
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I feel that any scientist ever found to have indulged in such behaviour should be tossed out of science (similar to a 
crooked cop), and I view those who partake in these activities with disgust. I realised I may hold a rather extreme 
viewpoint here, but I feel that falsifying or creating data simply goes against everything science stands for: truth; an 
unbiased verifiable source of information; promoting understanding about our world; advancing the human race.  
(Brendan) 
My views of fraud and the manipulation of data have not changed much over the course of the semester. I still 
believe that scientists should be completely honest, because science is a field that is concerned with facts. (Ella) 
The epistemological stance held by Brendan and Ella clearly allows no room for ambiguity, 
doubt, or moral ambivalence in science.  
Some students in this category could accept the humanity of scientists and that they might be 
susceptible to non-scientific pressures or motivations. However, while these students might 
understand why this occurs, it did not alter their perception of the objectivity of science. Instead, 
they felt that some scientists do not live up to their ideal. While most students in this category 
focused on distal views of science (perhaps because their less nuanced understanding does not 
leave room for the adoption of multiple positions) some were able to identify with scientists, at 
least to some extent, as Lucy describes understanding the scientists’ data manipulation and her 
use of ‘we’ in this reflection:  
The in-class discussions helped me understand a little of what motivates a scientist to commit scientific fraud – 
pressure to be correct was the main one, I thought, with personal beliefs close behind. As I discussed earlier, it’s 
essentially impossible for humans to be objective. I think that often we pick a theory or idea that we like, or consider 
‘beautiful’, and we will defend that theory until we are conclusively proven wrong. I can understand why scientists 
do this, but I do not think it’s particularly ‘good’ science, since science almost by definition is very rational and 
logical. (Lucy) 
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Lucy has not realized the importance of defending theories as one of the drivers for scientific 
progress, as it ensures that those challenges that successfully overturn theories are robust and 
lead to better theories taking their place. The humanity that leads to bias and preference are thus 
seen wholly as flaws, rather than as elements that, handled well, make positive contributions to 
science. Matthew shows a similar stance: 
After three hours of listening to people state their opinions on the matter, I still can’t say my view has changed at all. 
What made me stick to my opinion was that the pressure that society places on scientist does not excuse scientists 
for fraudulent behaviour and manipulated data. If they want to be a “good scientist” they should aim to prove, 
disprove or make a discovery that follows the scientific method so it can be replicated and avoids error and/or 
extremely negative consequences.  (Matthew) 
However, here we see some evidence of a potential softening of this apparently black-and-white 
vision of good science. The presence of the word ‘extremely’ in the final phrase suggests that, 
perhaps, this student might consider imperfect scientific method to be acceptable if there were 
little or no negative consequences. A focus on the consequences of an action does appear to lead 
students to a greater awareness of complexity, prompting the beginnings of a transition to mode 
2. In the excerpt below, Rosie makes a judgment based on the consequences of actions that she 
labels as fraud but she considers only extreme positions.  
It seems to me that fraud isn’t such a bad thing at low levels, as it is usually only to remove inconsistencies which 
are relatively minor in regards to the rest of the results from the experiment. However major fraud, such as 
manufacturing results, I would regard as being much more serious. Also fraud in regards to medical science, or other 
fields with a say over human living should be strictly forbidden so as to prevent the unnecessary loss of life. (Rosie) 
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Although her stance is still based on the certainty of right and wrong, she does recognise that 
different responses might be valid for different types of ‘fraud’, paving the way for the transition 
to mode 2. 
Transitions to Mode 2: multiplicity 
If students persist in holding mode 1 views, they will be unable to fully develop the skills needed 
to identify where judgment needs to be exercised and to make or evaluate those judgments. 
However, some students showed evidence of moving beyond the dualist mode to mode 2 of 
Perry’s scheme. In the context of this course, mode 2 covers students who are struggling with the 
issues raised and are confused about where they stand. For those students where a transition was 
evident, that transition lay in their acceptance that science is not as objective as they had 
previously thought. However, in this mode, they have not yet realized that there might be a 
sound basis on which to make judgments. Transition to this level is thus characterised by 
confusion and frustration at the loss of certainty.   
Both students quoted below accept that some manipulation of data might be constructive but still 
feel uncomfortable with it, labelling it as fraud.  There is a perception that there must be a line 
between what is and is not acceptable but they cannot see where this line can be drawn or how it 
can be justified. This was seen largely in the context of professional science although many 
students recognized that the issue has implications for their own development as scientists, as 
shown by both quotes below.  
Would I even be useful as a scientist if I didn’t make my numbers neater? Would people take my work seriously? 
Millikan found that honesty held his work back, that there was too much opposition for him to continue his work 
under that kind of negativity. So what is more right, to be honest and have no one listen to you, or to ‘adjust’ data so 
that your work might be useful? I am so unsure about myself now. I don’t know where I stand. I’m really 
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uncomfortable with the lack of clarity that I have in regard to the place of fraud and data manipulation in science, 
but I hope that as I continue to learn and grow as a scientist I will find that my thoughts and beliefs become clearer. 
(Merryn) 
Merryn has picked up on a really important reason to present data as more tidy than it might, 
perhaps, be in the raw, but does not yet have the capacity to accept that there is no hard and fast 
rule that gives the right answer in deciding what to do. She still wants one decision – to tidy up 
and be heard or to be honest and ignored – to be the right one.  Alicia, on the other hand, 
recognizes that there may not be a clearly defined answer: 
This definitely isn’t an issue with a clearly defined answer, or at least not one I can see. The more I write this, the 
more my head is going round in circles – I can see arguments for both sides. I’ve come to realise that the problem of 
data manipulation and fraud is a much more complicated one than I previously thought. Whereas before I was 
wholly against it on principle (with the exception of high-school fraud), without having ever put much thought into 
the situation. Now, I found myself balancing some really significant scientific discoveries, which may not have 
occurred, or would have occurred much later without fraud, with the slow corruption of science and scientific 
methodology which can be seen right from the lowest levels of science with my own need to manipulate data to fit 
in with what I saw as ‘right answers,’ rather than questioning where my own answers had come from, which could 
potentially lead to even more significant discoveries. (Alicia) 
Here, Alicia connects distal and proximal views, but in a way that perhaps misses a significant 
underlying difference. In her proximal experience, data manipulation occurs in order to achieve 
an externally given answer, so no judgment is needed about the answer itself. Distal 
manipulation occurs because of the absence of known answers, leaving room for competing 
theories, with one being believed in or subscribed to by the (fraudulent) scientist. 
Transitions to Mode 3: contextual relativism 
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Both of the examples above seem to treat fraud/manipulation as the result of conscious decisions 
to deliberately deceive. Transition to the next mode, contextual relativism, involves an 
epistemological shift. Students in this category exhibit a more sophisticated view of science, 
which is expressed as an understanding of the complexity of science and a resulting need to be 
more sceptical about published results. They have come to accept that scientists do manipulate 
data for various reasons and that not all such manipulation is fraudulent, indicating that they have 
moved beyond a procedural view of scientific method as an unvarying set of rules. There is some 
recognition of the subjective aspects involved in doing scientific research and that scientists are 
individuals and therefore might not all make the same judgments in the same situation. One 
consequence of this is that they recognise that judgment also needs to be shown in the 
interpretation of published results because alternative interpretations of what is presented might 
be possible. These students are coming to understand the evidence-based nature of science, a 
transformation evident in the following excerpts: 
We’ve discussed the difficulty in being an apparently ‘perfect’ scientist and I’ve realised that it is more difficult than 
one may think, simply because of the difficulty in scientific work. I’ve realised that the issue of being a ‘perfect 
scientist’ is entwined into something more than simply performing an experiment correctly.  (Eliza) 
Bias and the pressure placed on scientist can lead to fraud and errors.  And as a result I have found myself 
questioning more things I considered to be ‘facts ’and looking for alternative causes or explanations.  (Nicholas) 
Initially I felt that the deletion of data was fraudulent in any given circumstance, but class discussions made me 
realise how context is crucial in determining whether it is purposely deceptive or ‘good science’. (Olivia) 
Students who have transitioned to this category apply their new understanding of professional 
science to their own practice of science. They see that laboratory exercises undertaken during 
their degree are preparing them to practice as scientists and they reflect on the need to try to 
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understand results, rather than simply looking for a right answer. Both proximal and distal views 
of science become more sophisticated as students realize that developing the ability to make 
judgments about data is an important part of their learning. They are coming to see science as a 
quest for knowledge, rather than as a collection of facts to be learned; in fact developing the 
ability to critique knowledge claims. For some students, this resulted in a significant change in 
attitude towards the laboratory components of their courses and many become critical of their 
own prior manipulation of laboratory results.  
Errors happen and unexplained results occur, this is half the fun! It has emerged this week that the important thing is 
to be able to explain or at least reflect on what went wrong, or rather what is scientifically occurring to give such 
results. I have realized that my practice of simply forging results to get out of labs early is selling myself student 
short of a true depth of scientific understanding that could lead to great discoveries in the future. (Lachlan) 
It is interesting to note here Lachlan’s recognition of the importance of reflecting on, rather than 
always necessarily having an explanation for, what went wrong. A related observation was made 
by Celia, who reflects on her biology tutor telling her to discard a result that is too low because it 
is most likely due to a technical problem. She is able to use this proximal experience to develop a 
more sophisticated distal view as she considers the role of expertise and community feedback: 
Data interpretation is not always straightforward but sometimes scientists will need to make judgments and given 
that they possess a great deal of understanding of their field and experience, I think they are qualified to make such 
judgments. This is not to say that scientists will not sometimes make the wrong judgment. However, through the 
scientific process these wrong judgments can be discovered, which is part of what makes science work as well as it 
does. (Celia) 
Both Lachlan and Celia have recognised that anomalous results are an occasion for judgment and 
that different scientists (or students) might make different decisions in such situations. 
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Transitions to Mode 4: Commitment 
The most sophisticated responses to data manipulation exhibited an understanding of the 
interaction between science, education and society; students with such responses recognized that 
attitudes and values may be socially determined. Instead of simply blaming individuals for 
unethical behaviour, these students recognize that both students and scientists respond to external 
pressures and that this may impact on the way they undertake scientific activity. Thus in the 
context of learning about science, Perry’s fourth mode of thinking is characterized by the ability 
to not only recognize that social systems place both scientists and students under pressure to 
perform, but also to critique those systems and make judgments about them.  
Transitions to mode 4 were evident in comments such as Patrick’s reflection on his previously 
inadequate view of science. 
I would never have thought that there would be anything remotely interesting about the concept of science – don’t 
get me wrong studying science is interesting, but really, everyone knows what science is right? We’ve all studied a 
certain amount of the subject in high school at least. But this has gotten me thinking – what do we learn about 
science in high school? By the number of people who fake their lab results in high school science classes, I don’t 
think we learn what the essence of science is, how science works, and most importantly why we do science. 
(Patrick) 
Patrick has realized that his education has not provided him with a useful understanding of the 
nature of science so has become critical of the system that has led him into the belief that it is 
acceptable to manipulate laboratory results. Similarly, both Joe and Hannah are aware of the 
different environments of proximal and distal science and have suggestions for the education 
system, as shown in these excerpts. 
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The most important thing in the final exam is to get as many answers right as possible, and less emphasis is put on 
learning from your mistakes- as the final exam marks the end of the semester, there is not generally a chance for 
this. I think professors (although I am sure many already do) should emphasise to their students that getting things 
wrong is often just as important as getting them right- anomalies in research can themselves lead to new discoveries. 
(Joe) 
 
Reflecting on the role of creativity in science has been of particular interest to me this semester. I see a strong 
disparity between studying science and undertaking scientific research....... I think a creative approach to problem 
solving and data interpretation is key to good scientific method and as such I think the encouragement of creativity 
in students would go a long way to preparing science students to be scientists. (Hannah) 
 
Other students criticized the culture of science for the pressures placed on scientists, recognizing 
that the level of data manipulation that occurs is to some extent determined by scientists’ need to 
succeed in the competitive world of professional science. The following shows a student who is 
perhaps still undergoing the transition between mode 3 and mode 4: 
Is it all bad? I believe that some manipulation and presentation is purely simplification and has merit in that. 
Sometimes to focus on the important issues at hand tidying up results is logical and doesn’t constitute fraud. 
Aberrations in data are inevitable and often insignificant, finding their cause in human or mechanical error. It’s not 
always feasible to repeat experiments on account of a couple of unusual points. Perfect results are unobtainable but 
against a background of competition for recognition and financial aid there is an incredible amount of pressure to 
produce them. There should perhaps be more recognition of this difficulty and more understanding amongst 
scientists when all must deal with the same problems. (Zoe) 
The use of words such as ‘aberration’ and ‘error’, and the reference to ‘perfect results’ (which 
even if unobtainable by implication are “out there” in some platonic form) suggest mode 3 
thinking. However, the recognition that all scientists deal with such problems, and that mutual 
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understanding of this would be better than striving for unattainable perfection, suggests the 
transition to mode 4 is under way. 
Students transitioning to mode 4 show an appreciation of the complexity arising from the 
interactions between science and society and have developed their own views on what is and is 
not acceptable. While this might not be commitment in the sense used by Perry, it does show a 
domain-specific acquisition of values which students are using to make judgments.  
Relationships between sophistication of understanding of scientific judgment and degree to 
which proximal and distal views are separated  
Our second research question was what factors influence students’ ethical judgments in proximal 
and distal domains?  Our findings suggest that the two features (proximal/distal views and 
variation in sophistication of understanding of scientific judgment) that emerged in the students’ 
reflections can be represented as two dimensions of variation, as shown in Figure 2.  In this 
figure, the vertical axis represents variation in sophistication of understanding in relation to 
scientific judgment, and the horizontal axis represents the degree to which students’ proximal 
and distal conceptions differ or coincide.  
Insert Figure 2 about here 
Initially, many students applied different ethical standards to proximal and distal science, clearly 
indicating that they saw them as separate enterprises. Although a small number of students 
applied the moral absolutist view to both student and professional science (represented by 
quadrant B), most expected higher standards of ethical behaviour from professional scientists 
than from themselves and their peers (a position represented by quadrant A). As noted earlier, 
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this was largely due to their idealistic view of scientists as objective seekers of truth and their 
failure to consider their own learning in the context of what scientists actually do. 
As students reconsidered their initial views, many recognised the uncertainty of science which 
allowed them to make ethical judgments using both a new understanding of professional science 
and a consideration of the science they do in the light of professional practice. This led to a range 
of opinions on the ethical standards expected for proximal and distal behaviours that fell into two 
broad classes; some students accepted the distinction between proximal and distal science and 
used the differences to justify different ethical standards while others more strongly identified 
with scientists and applied similar standards.  Thus by the end of the course, some students held 
views corresponding to quadrants C and D in Figure 2.  We explore these different positions in 
the following. 
Responses corresponding to quadrant C in Figure 2 justified different proximal and distal ethical 
standards on the basis of two factors; the lack of authenticity of many laboratory exercises and 
the greater consequences of dishonesty for a professional scientist. Both Chris and Liam, quoted 
below, justify lower ethical standards for students than for scientists on the basis of these factors.  
Most of the experiments that we are doing as students have already been done, and the results are well known and 
widely accepted as the “right” ones. This means that when we get something that doesn’t fit the expected results we 
get a massive sense of being wrong which can be very hard to accept. The frustration of being wrong is what creates 
the temptation to tweak results.  In contrast, professionals are crossing new boundaries and so there is no authority 
as to whether or not they are right or wrong. On top of that, since no one knows which direction a new experiment 
will go it is even more important that a professional does not mislead others down the wrong path. If they do, then a 
whole generation of scientists can be left digging in the wrong place. (Chris) 
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They agreed that in class, changing results was excusable because students just want to be able to pass their courses 
or to not have to stay in for extra time during lab sessions. As opposed to big research projects where the results 
could make a real difference in the world. (Liam) 
Erin has taken a slightly different approach to consequences, by considering the relative power 
and authority of students and famous scientists: 
The political slant to Eddington’s case is for me the difference between my ignoring of a point that is way off my 
expected range in chemistry, and the fraud that Eddington committed. The misuse of power and authority and the 
intent behind the action are the two things that contribute to the separation. (Erin) 
Typical student laboratory activities do not have the uncertainty that characterises professional 
science (Chinn & Malhotra, 2002; Hofstein & Lunetta, 2004) but these students were now able 
to identify this as a significant difference from professional science and use it to justify lower 
ethical standards. 
Responses corresponding to quadrant D evidence a merging of proximal and distal views as 
students begin to identify more strongly with scientists. These students maintained a level of 
idealism as they became more critical of themselves for failing to live up to the standards 
expected for scientists. They saw laboratory work as a preparation for professional practice and 
therefore they should be practising professional behaviour.  
We were given several case studies of scientific fraud – I even stood aghast with some of them. I was astonished to 
see what it took some people to reach a certain goal. Even though I was aware of this issue before it was presented 
to us in SUtM, I had never really related it to my life or myself previously. As a good science student, in several 
occasions, I have manipulated the data that I got from my laboratory practicals. I remember in a discussion session it 
was mentioned that there is no difference between scientists and us, in terms of being fraudulent with our 
experimental results. After a little bit of pondering, I realised that this was indeed true. (Alex) 
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Alex notes that this was the first time he had considered scientists in relation to his own 
behaviour. It is this aspect that is critical here, because he is explicitly comparing and critiquing 
proximal and distal views and experiences. A less idealistic approach that is still based on 
identification with scientists was the recognition of similar motivations for behaviour that may 
be considered unethical. While in itself the above excerpt might be interpreted as simply a shift 
from quadrant A of Figure 2 to quadrant B, much of the rest of Alex’s reflection reveals he has 
also developed a substantially more sophisticated understanding of scientific judgements, as for 
example where he reflects on how science may at least in the long term be self-correcting: 
Quite often scientists are swept in a current of ideas that leads them astray to the actual truth. However, these errors 
are corrected by the scientific community itself, which is one of science’s strengths. Sometimes corrections may 
take years, decades, or even centuries (such as the Copernican revolution). An improved understanding of a 
particular theory may result from innovative technology or changing perspectives. (Alex) 
Alex himself describes how he used to have a much more fact-based understanding of science, 
and hence it seems from his reflections that by the end of the course he has moved from a 
position represented by quadrant A to one represented by quadrant D in Figure 2. 
Similarly, while Jess does not make a judgment about scientists’ actions in the excerpt below, 
she accepts the range of motivations that contribute to data manipulation, seeing scientists as 
imperfect human beings, like herself. Implied in this is an acceptance of science as a human 
activity, rather than a completely objective pursuit. Again, it appears that this is not something 
she had previously considered and is indicative of a merging of proximal and distal views of 
science. 
Now that I think about it, how different am I from Millikan and Eddington? They probably wanted fame, 
recognition, convenience and to prove their hypothesis correct. I wanted good grades, getting out of class on time, 
and to have convenient and explainable data to write my preconceived conclusion on. (Jess) 
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Thus our data suggest that reflection on these case studies may either strengthen a sense of 
difference through an awareness of asymmetries in terms of power and consequences, or reduce 
it through the recognition that scientists are fallible and potentially flawed human beings just like 
the students themselves. 
Discussion  
We set out to examine students’ responses to issues of ethical judgment in scientific research by 
providing case studies where famous scientists made decisions to use data selectively. These 
decisions were justified by the difficulties of data collection as well as the scientists’ desire to 
have an impact. As students discussed and reflected on the case studies, it became clear that 
these issues challenged students’ epistemological and ethical stances at a fundamental level. 
Many students entered the course with an idealised perception of science as completely objective 
with little or no need for judgment. They had little understanding of the ways in which scientists 
use evidence to come to conclusions or of the tentative nature of their conclusions, resulting in a 
failure to recognise the ethical implications of data interpretation. Faced with examples of 
famous scientists using their judgment where the evidence was ambiguous and there was no clear 
answer, many students found their initial understanding of science challenged. For some 
students, this led to profound changes in how they view science and what scientists do.  
Our results illustrate considerable variation in students’ views of the ethics of scientific research, 
both in relation to professional science (distal view) and the science they experience as part of 
their degree (proximal view). We found that students’ developing ability to recognise, 
understand and perhaps make ethical judgments relies upon changing conceptions of scientific 
knowledge that recognise uncertainty and the role of evidence. The categories we have identified 
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form a hierarchical sequence, ranging from a moral absolutism in which science is seen as truth 
and scientists deal with unambiguous facts to the ability to recognize the complexity of scientific 
research and its interaction with society, with the concomitant need to exhibit judgment in the 
analysis and interpretation of data. While our focus was on developing professional judgment in 
the use of data, the student responses clearly exemplify the intellectual and ethical positions first 
developed by Perry (1970). 
It is evident that the students in our sample are engaging with the issue of data interpretation and 
observing change within themselves, with a number reflecting on their earlier and less 
sophisticated (and often unquestioned) views of science. We clearly see students struggling with 
the first two transitions that form part of the Perry scheme (Figure 1), firstly in recognizing that 
science is more than a collection of incontestable facts and secondly in understanding the 
evidence-based nature of scientific conclusions. The third transition, which entails commitment 
to a set of values, is less evident although some students do make value-laden judgments about 
the culture of science and their own education. We also observed some students who did not 
change their views, maintaining a largely dualistic outlook.  Further investigation is required to 
understand why there was a much greater impact on some students than others.  
There is likely to be a complex relationship between a student’s intellectual development, their 
proximal and distal views of science and their experience of science teaching (Hogan, 2000).  
Although we set out to examine students’ developing awareness of the role of ethical decision-
making with respect to data manipulation and presentation, it became evident that this 
development is dependent on, and coupled to, the development of a more complex view of 
knowledge than that it is right or wrong. As illustrated in the preceding sections, students 
become aware of both more factors and increasing possibilities, and this opens up the space in 
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which they are can see that judgments need to be made, as well as ultimately furnishing the bases 
for such judgments.  This development is essential to gaining a grasp of practice (Ford, 2008; 
Ford, 2015), which encompasses the construction and critique of knowledge. In contrast to the 
context-dependent judgments and actions one would expect from a student with such a grasp of 
practice, students with a dualistic mindset are dependent on rules defining right and wrong and 
will have difficulty recognizing the need for judgment in any context.  
It is striking that we see almost the full range of Perry’s positions among first year students, in 
contrast to other studies of epistemological development that show change occurring over a 
period of years (reviewed in Hofer & Pintrich, 1997).  One open question relating to 
epistemological development is the extent to which the stages do, in fact, represent a 
developmental process. Observations that different positions occur in different contexts and in 
students of different ages and that students can stall or go backward have been taken as evidence 
against developmental stages.  Instead, it has been argued that students have a range of epistemic 
resources and deploy them according to how useful they are in particular contexts (Elby et al., 
2016; Hammer & Elby, 2002).  Our observation of all stages in response to a relatively short-
term intervention (a two week case study combined with ongoing reflection and revisiting 
throughout a single semester course) supports this view as an accelerated developmental pathway 
seems less likely than a context-dependent recognition of greater nuance. Coupling the Perry 
scheme with the notion of distinct proximal and distal views of science and scientific practice 
emphasises our sense that it is not a scheme through which students progress, as they are capable 
of simultaneously holding more and less sophisticated positions in relation to their own 
behaviour and that of others. The greater sophistication that we observed as the course 
progressed may have resulted from students’ recognising that science was an appropriate context 
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for the more sophisticated epistemology they adopted in other domains; our results clearly 
support a changing conception of science, in which students explicitly link proximal and distal 
views.  
This is consistent with increasing evidence supporting the domain-specific nature of epistemic 
cognition (Chinn et al., 2011; Muis, Bendixen, & Haerle, 2006; Sinatra & Chinn, 2012) and 
confirms previous suggestions that proximal and distal science may be considered different 
domains where different epistemologies are applied (Hogan, 2000; Sandoval, 2005). In an 
argument for a broader conception of epistemic cognition, (Chinn et al., 2011) included 
epistemic values, aims and virtues, which recognise the importance of affect and motivation. 
These were all seen to be context-dependent and largely defined by the learning environment. 
For example, epistemic virtues – dispositions that promote epistemic development – are perhaps 
are not supported by the way many science courses are taught but could be fostered by a more 
open and questioning environment. Models for the development of epistemic cognition 
(Bendixen & Rule, 2004; Muis et al., 2006) also include the learning environment, or epistemic 
climate, as a modulator of the epistemic approach students adopt. Such models view epistemic 
development as enculturation into ways of thinking that are influenced by culture, academic 
environment and the instructional context. 
Acceptance of the argument for context-dependence raises questions about what prompts the 
adaptation of epistemological resources from one domain to another. One important factor in the 
course studied here was the recognition that science is a human (and community) activity, as our 
students developed increasingly sophisticated views in parallel with increased empathy or 
identification with scientists. Similarities between the epistemic cognition and conceptual change 
literatures have been noted (Sinatra & Chinn, 2012) so our results would suggest that one of the 
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most significant conceptual changes needed to develop a more sophisticated epistemology in 
science learning is for students to see scientists as fallible human beings doing the best they can 
in a competitive environment.  This is supported by a recent study comparing students’ responses 
to conflicts in history and biology (Thomm, Barzilai, & Bromme, 2017). Explanations for the 
biology conflict were more likely to be focussed on the topic and how it had been addressed 
whereas those for the history conflict were also related to the researcher’s background and 
motivations.  It was suggested that this was because history was perceived as more subjective 
and therefore more open to human influence. The challenge is, therefore, to convince students to 
make the conceptual leap to a more comprehensive and humanist view of science by overcoming 
deeply-held proximal views of science as fact. 
  
One instance where we do see transferability of epistemological and ethical values, is the 
inappropriate extrapolation from proximal to distal science. Such extrapolation of the learning 
experience to professional behaviour has been observed in other disciplines and can hinder the 
development of a professional identity (Reid, Dahlgren, Petocz, & Dahlgren, 2008).  We have 
provided evidence that the same thing occurs in science, with students who maintain a dualistic 
proximal view of data interpretation exhibiting a limited distal view that excludes the need for 
judgment.  This is evident in the responses to anomalous data. Our students, like those in other 
studies (Del Carlo & Bodner, 2004; Vhurumuku et al., 2006), mostly thought it acceptable to 
alter their own results because they were not doing ‘real’ science. In a discussion of the lack of 
authenticity of many classroom science activities, Chinn and Malhotra (2002) noted that the 
rational response to anomalous data is to reject it for exactly the reasons these students give.  We 
showed that as the course progressed, many students moved from an unquestioned acceptance of 
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this view to a point where they could justify their different expectations in terms of the 
differences between their lab experience and professional science. However, this position still 
fails to address anomalous data in the context of genuine discovery; for scientists, an unexpected 
result might be an indication of a new phenomenon, but equally, it could arise for many other 
reasons. Some students, however, continued to see all data as ‘fact’ and labelled all rejection of 
anomalous data by scientists as unethical, regardless of context.  Another study has shown that 
unconsidered rejection of anomalous data occurs well into postgraduate training 
(Samarapungavan et al., 2006), suggesting that this view is resistant to change, perhaps because 
students remain tied to their proximal conceptions. The impact of proximal views on perceptions 
of science highlights the need for the integration of a more realistic approach to data 
interpretation into science curricula that better reflects the practices of science (Ford, 2008; Roth, 
2012). Examples such as this one demonstrate the value of examining students’ ideas and 
understandings that are situated in the learning environment as it allows an exploration of more 
nuanced and contextual factors (Bendixen & Rule, 2004; Chinn et al., 2011; Elby et al., 2016; 
Kelly et al., 2012; Sandoval et al., 2016; Sinatra & Chinn, 2012). 
 
Limitations 
Our study took a qualitative approach to identifying variation in student responses to questions of 
scientific ethics. We observed a wide range of responses but it was not possible to determine the 
frequency of the different responses within our sample. This was because our analysis was based 
on student reflections in which students could choose to discuss issues of importance to them. 
While most students did include data manipulation in their final reflection, some merely 
commented but did not explain their own views, while others included only proximal or only 
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distal views. Additionally, although our sample of 101 students was quite large for a qualitative 
study and did represent the range of science disciplines, this group may not be representative of 
the entire student population. The course studied here was an elective and thus our sample was 
self-selected to some extent. Students choosing this course, which was presented as a 
multidisciplinary course on the nature of science, may have broader interests or a greater 
willingness to engage with such issues than those who chose not to do it. Further studies could 
sample a more representative population of students. We do not know whether the changes we 
observed are lasting and will persist in the face of different approaches to science teaching in 
students’ other courses. This could be addressed by a longitudinal study tracking students’ views 
over the course of their degree and complemented by classroom observations and interview to 
explore individual student responses.  
Conclusion and pedagogical implications  
It appears that many students do not recognise the ethical dimension of data interpretation in 
science because they have a naive view of science as totally objective. We have shown that 
substantial epistemological and ethical changes can occur when science students are encouraged 
to discuss and justify their own views and that the issue of use and abuse of data is a productive 
stimulus for change. As students compared their own laboratory work in other courses with 
historical examples of science, they were able to recognise different proximal and distal 
standards and consider implications for their own behaviour. This enabled them to make context-
related ethical judgments about both scientists and themselves, supporting suggestions for the 
inclusion of historical case studies in the science curriculum (Allchin, Andersen, & Nielsen, 
2014; Clough, 2011). More sophisticated views tended to be accompanied by increasing 
identification of students with scientists, often leading to a merging of proximal and distal views 
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of science. Interestingly, this was sometimes also coupled with criticisms of the education 
system that had led them to hold views they now recognised as unsatisfactory. 
Our study contributes to calls to consider the epistemological implications of science teaching 
and learning activities (for example, Chinn & Malhotra, 2002; Duschl, 2008; Ford, 2008; 
Hofstein & Lunetta, 2004; Roth, 2012), by providing evidence that students extrapolate proximal 
epistemologies derived from simple laboratory activities to professional science; clearly an 
unintended consequence. We have also shown that reflection on proximal and distal activities 
can have a significant impact on students’ conceptions of science and provided support for the 
need to address both proximal and distal conceptions of science in scaffolding learning about the 
nature of science (Sandoval, 2005). We would go further and suggest that students’ attention 
should be explicitly drawn to these two contexts; as our discussion of Figure 2 illustrates, when 
students make comparisons between themselves and scientists, they are able to identify 
contextual differences which justify different behaviours, leading to a more complex 
understanding of science.  Learning critical thinking (in its broadest sense) in science is 
“existentially as well as intellectually challenging” (Nelson, 1999, p178) and science curricula 
need to provide opportunities for students to engage with complex and ambiguous issues in ways 
that encourage reflection and personal development. Students in the course studied here valued 
the opportunity to develop and discuss their own opinions but also found the approach 
challenging (Howitt & Wilson, 2014), which are likely to be key factors in fostering a supportive 
epistemic climate and prompting change (Bendixen & Rule, 2004; Chinn et al., 2011). 
The preceding discussion suggests that curriculum reform might focus on problematization of 
existing teaching and learning activities coupled with reflection as a complementary strategy to 
the development of more authentic laboratory activities. The interpretation of data is an excellent 
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issue to problematize in this way because not only is it crucial to the practice of science, but it 
also meets the criteria of dissonance and relevance identified as key factors in one model of 
epistemological change (Bendixen & Rule, 2004). Data interpretation is relevant because 
students can relate it to their own laboratory experience but creates dissonance when they 
become aware of the issues professional scientists face and the differences between the proximal 
and distal contexts. This was evident in the surprise at scientists’ behaviour many students 
expressed (Howitt & Wilson, 2014) and prompts epistemic doubt, which is a pre-condition for 
change in this model. While necessary for change, relevance and dissonance were not seen as 
sufficient in the model, and this was confirmed by our finding that different students achieved 
different epistemic outcomes. 
Equally importantly, our results suggest that a lack of awareness of the ethical dimension to 
decisions about data manipulation and presentation may actually serve as a barrier to 
development of a more sophisticated understanding of the nature of scientific data and 
knowledge; students simply fail to recognise that science is a domain where a more sophisticated 
epistemology is relevant.  We might speculate that one of the reasons that students’ conceptions 
of the nature of science are notoriously hard to change is that they encounter very few 
opportunities in their learning to explicitly explore such issues and confront ambiguity. We hope 
that other researchers and educators will develop approaches to teaching and learning that allow 
students to reflect on how ethical decision-making enters into scientific practice both in courses 
like the one studied here and in more conventional scientific coursework.   
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Table 1: Proximal and distal expressions of epistemological modes 
Mode Distal view Proximal view 
1. Dualism 
 
Naïve view that science is 
objective, data speaks for itself 
so no manipulation is 
acceptable 
Some students show empathy: 
‘scientists as people’, can 
understand their motivations 
and can relate to own 
motivations but still see science 
as completely objective  
2. Multiplicity Naïve view of science 
questioned but unsure how to 
proceed, reduced trust in 
science 
Questions own values and 
behaviour, some understanding 
that context may be important 
but confused about how to deal 
with this 
3. Contextual 
relativism  
 
Understanding the need for 
judgment in data interpretation 
and that not all selective data 
use is fraud, more critical of 
scientific knowledge, 
recognizes the role of evidence 
Applies new understanding of 
distal science to own learning, 
perception of self as a scientist, 
learning to use judgment and 
apply ethical standards  
4. Commitment 
within 
relativism 
Critique of culture of science  Critique of the education 
system 
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Figure 1: Major transitions in the Perry scheme of ethical and intellectual development. Perry’s 
original nine positions can be grouped into four major categories separated by significant 
transitions, based on Moore (2002). 
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Figure 2: Relationships between levels of sophistication and separation of proximal and distal 
views 
 
 
 
 
 
 
